Morocco 2026 election — USFP: a detailed national platform that leaves the diaspora largely outside its twenty pledges

That contrast produces an MMNEWS MRE score of 39%. The rating is not a verdict on the USFP’s social-democratic programme as a whole. It measures the clarity of policies addressing citizens whose lives, careers, families and assets span Morocco and another country. National reforms can benefit them, but a diaspora commitment must also explain access from abroad, cross-border rights, responsible institutions and delivery deadlines.

Political outreach built around the existing voting system

The USFP has an organised overseas presence known as “Region 13.” In early September, it brought together activists from around fifteen countries, including the United States, Canada, several European states, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt and Mexico. The resulting appeal argued that Moroccans abroad should not be viewed only through their financial transfers. They should take part in public decision-making and Morocco’s political life.

For the 2026 ballot, however, the practical message focused on the rules already in force. Registered MREs who would be in Morocco were encouraged to vote in person; those unable to travel were urged to complete the proxy-voting process. This mobilisation is substantive and earns the party 9 points out of 15 for participation. It provides information and uses a genuine international network. But it helps citizens navigate the current model rather than pledging to replace it with direct voting abroad.

That distinction is central. A proxy may prevent distance from eliminating a vote, yet the elector still entrusts the act to someone physically present in Morocco. The final manifesto does not commit to polling stations in consulates, postal voting or a secure remote ballot. Earlier USFP electoral memoranda called for simplified participation by Moroccans abroad, and proposals reported in 2025 went further by linking diaspora involvement to electoral lists managed through consular channels and simplified registration. The political groundwork exists; the twenty commitments do not convert it into a dated 2026 reform.

Representation is the party’s strongest political asset

The USFP scores 8 out of 10 on parliamentary representation. The party has repeatedly supported fuller institutional participation for Moroccans abroad, and Region 13 frames the diaspora as a participant in decision-making rather than a lobbying audience. That continuity deserves more credit than a passing campaign reference.

What is missing is a final design. The manifesto does not identify a number of seats, a chamber, overseas constituencies or a nomination method. It does not explain how representation would reflect the diversity of a diaspora spread across Europe, North America, Africa, the Gulf and other regions. A principle has been established, but voters cannot yet assess who would represent them, how that person would be elected or what constituency they would answer to. This is why the score is high but not complete.

Digital administration stops short of consular accountability

Administrative reform is among the USFP’s clearest national promises. The party wants 100% of procedures to become digital and processing times to fall by 70%. Few domestic targets could be more relevant to a citizen dealing with Morocco from overseas. Online applications, document tracking and data exchange between agencies could cut travel costs and reduce the uncertainty that often surrounds a file handled across several administrations.

The diaspora score in this category is nevertheless only 2 out of 10. The platform does not name priority consular procedures, set maximum turnaround times for passports or civil-status documents, create a public performance dashboard or specify a complaints and appeals route. Nor does it explain how consulates would exchange information with municipalities, courts and ministries inside Morocco. The national target is ambitious, but a target for the whole administration cannot automatically be credited as a consular guarantee.

A productive-economy agenda without a diaspora gateway

The USFP proposes support for 100,000 businesses through investment-charter mechanisms, a 30% share of public procurement for very small, small and medium-sized firms, and a public financial institution devoted to their financing and monitoring. These measures could appeal to Moroccan entrepreneurs abroad seeking to open a factory, fund a start-up or build a project in an underserved region.

Distance, however, creates risks that ordinary business policy does not solve. Overseas investors may struggle to verify land, coordinate permits, understand tax exposure in two jurisdictions or monitor a local partner. The manifesto offers no MRE one-stop shop, co-investment vehicle, guarantee, binding processing deadline or tailored mediation channel. It also sets no diaspora share within the target of 100,000 supported firms. The party receives 7 out of 20: the economic framework could support diaspora enterprise, but the route into that framework is not designed.

Savings and remittances remain an unaddressed policy field

The weakest category is savings and remittances, with 1 point out of 10. MMNEWS does not score parties according to how much money MREs already send. It asks whether they propose safe, transparent and voluntary ways to connect overseas savings with productive investment. The USFP platform contains no diaspora bond, regulated investment product, regional fund, transfer-cost measure or dedicated protection for small non-resident investors.

This omission is striking because the manifesto wants to finance industrial growth, innovation and territorial equality. A transparent savings instrument could connect those ambitions to diaspora capital without reducing MREs to a source of cash. It would need clear risk disclosure, governance, tax information and an independent complaints process. None is specified.

Social protection does not yet travel across borders

The USFP promises to raise the minimum pension by 25%, reduce pension inequality by 30% and give retirees priority access to healthcare. Those measures could help an MRE who permanently resettles in Morocco and justify 3 points out of 10. Yet many diaspora careers are divided across two or more systems. Contributions may have been paid in Morocco, France, Belgium, Spain or a country with very different bilateral arrangements.

The platform does not address the aggregation of contribution periods, portability, life certificates, multilingual advice or administrative support for families with mixed statuses. It also offers no country-by-country timetable for improving social-security coordination. A strong domestic pension policy is valuable, but it is not a cross-border social-protection strategy.

Return and younger generations receive indirect support

Return and resettlement score 2 out of 10. The manifesto sets no coordinated pathway for qualification recognition, school enrolment, healthcare, housing, business creation or administrative reintegration. It also treats none of the newer forms of return: circular mobility, part-time residence, remote work from Morocco or a business operating between two countries. The absence matters because many MREs want greater involvement without making a single, permanent move.

For younger generations, language and culture, the USFP receives 2 out of 5. Its domestic cultural policy is substantial: new or renovated cinemas and theatres, 200 public libraries, digital access to content and fuller implementation of Amazigh as an official language. These initiatives could enrich the cultural relationship with Morocco. But the manifesto does not extend them to language teaching abroad, diaspora associations, digital programmes for children or partnerships with host-country institutions.

Research creates an opening for diaspora expertise

The skills category performs better at 5 out of 10. The USFP wants research spending to reach 2% of GDP, ten new university hubs in artificial intelligence, renewable energy and biotechnology, and stronger links between universities and business. Such an agenda could attract Moroccan scientists, engineers and entrepreneurs abroad to joint research or technology projects.

Once again, the connector is missing. There is no platform for short expert missions, visiting chairs, jointly funded laboratories, remote teaching, mentoring or targeted recruitment of diaspora specialists. The programme creates an ecosystem in which MRE expertise could matter, but not the mechanism that would match people to needs.

The MMNEWS verdict

The 39% score captures a revealing mismatch. The USFP has a longstanding political case for diaspora representation, a functioning international organisation and a highly quantified national manifesto. Yet those strengths sit beside one another rather than forming a single MRE policy. The twenty pledges do not connect political rights with consular delivery, investment access, portable social protection, return or cultural transmission.

The party would not need to rewrite its entire programme to close the gap. A dedicated diaspora roadmap could extend its own targets: define overseas voting and representation, apply the 70% processing-time reduction to named consular services, reserve a transparent route into SME support, negotiate cross-border pension priorities and open the new research hubs to structured diaspora missions. Until such mechanisms are published, the USFP offers Moroccans abroad political recognition and several possible indirect benefits, but too few commitments they can test against a timetable. That is what the 39% measures.