Ceuta 2026: Post-crisis tensions rise again as August 15 approaches

Ceuta has regained an appearance of calm, but beneath that surface the crisis is entering a more complex phase.

Nearly two weeks after the mass crossings at the end of July, the issue is no longer confined to border control. It has moved into reception centres, courtrooms, families still searching for relatives, and social media platforms where new calls are circulating around a possible crossing attempt on August 15.

At the centre of this new phase is a particularly sensitive issue: Moroccan minors who remain in Ceuta.

Minors become the priority

Spanish figures now point to more than 1,500 minors who recently arrived in Ceuta, while Madrid and the People’s Party are increasingly converging on the same priority: returning those minors to their families in Morocco whenever legal conditions allow.

Rabat has already said it is ready to cooperate.

That position carries considerable political and legal significance because it clearly separates Morocco’s willingness to act from the constraints imposed by Spanish law.

A minor cannot simply be returned through a collective procedure. Spain must examine every case individually, verify identity and family circumstances, and determine whether reunification is consistent with the child’s best interests.

The precedent of 2021 remains highly relevant. Accelerated returns of Moroccan minors carried out at the time were later found by Spanish courts to have failed to respect the necessary legal safeguards.

As a result, delays in the current procedures cannot fairly be presented as Morocco refusing to take back its nationals.

Morocco has opened the door to cooperation. Spain must now apply its own legal framework and complete the required procedures.

How many people are really still in Ceuta?

A second major uncertainty concerns the number of people who remain inside the enclave.

Madrid had previously referred to around 2,000 people.

Local authorities in Ceuta, however, have since produced much higher estimates, ranging in some statements from 8,000 to 11,000 people.

That gap highlights one of the central problems of the post-crisis period: there is still no single, reliable picture of how many people remain in the city.

Some migrants are registered in official facilities.

Others are sleeping in industrial areas, public spaces or makeshift camps, outside the formal administrative system.

Some Ceuta residents have even begun sheltering minors at night to protect them from danger, illustrating that the humanitarian dimension of the crisis remains very real despite the calm at the border.

Those who stayed in Ceuta have neither reached mainland Spain nor returned to Morocco.

They are stranded between two shores.

Morocco shifts towards a judicial response

On the Moroccan side, a new stage of the response has begun: prosecutions and court proceedings.

Seven taxi drivers have been convicted in one of the first cases directly linked to the Ceuta events, after a court found that transporting would-be migrants towards Fnideq took place in circumstances amounting to facilitating irregular migration.

Media reports also indicate that more than one hundred people are being prosecuted or held in pre-trial detention in cases connected to the events.

Taxi unions are challenging some of the convictions, but the development shows that Moroccan authorities are moving beyond a purely security-based response at the border.

They are now looking at the networks and mechanisms that helped move people towards the area: transport, possible intermediaries, organisers and the accounts that spread digital calls.

That matters greatly for Morocco.

Faced with claims that the state deliberately allowed the situation to spiral out of control, investigations and judicial proceedings provide a concrete response to attempts to turn suspicion into political certainty.

August 15 becomes a new date of concern

The crisis could still take another turn in the days ahead.

Messages are circulating on Facebook, WhatsApp and other platforms calling for a possible collective crossing attempt on August 15.

There is currently no basis for concluding that these calls will translate into a real mobilisation.

But ignoring them would be a mistake.

The first crisis demonstrated that a rumour or viral message could move tens of thousands of people towards the border within hours.

The current calm should therefore not be treated as permanent.

For Moroccan authorities, the priorities appear clear: monitor the digital space, identify those behind the calls and prevent new gatherings around Fnideq, Belyounech and Bab Sebta.

Because if another crisis occurs, it may not begin at the border fence.

It may begin on a smartphone screen.

Spain’s political confrontation continues

Inside Spain, Ceuta remains a major political battleground.

During the first days of the crisis, some actors directed their criticism primarily at Rabat.

Today, much of the debate has shifted towards the Spanish government’s own performance: management of the minors, their distribution across autonomous regions, humanitarian capacity and Madrid’s preparedness for a crisis of this scale.

The growing convergence between the Spanish government and the People’s Party around prioritising the return of minors to their families in Morocco also suggests that the debate is moving away from accusations and towards practical solutions.

That development strengthens Rabat’s position.

The more the issue moves from political escalation to operational and legal cooperation, the easier it becomes to distinguish Morocco’s responsibilities from Spain’s domestic difficulties.

The human toll continues to rise

The humanitarian dimension remains the most tragic part of the crisis.

A recent report by The Guardian has referred to at least 141 deaths, a figure higher than earlier official totals.

That number should still be treated cautiously until it is confirmed through a unified and final official count.

But the scale of the tragedy is no longer in doubt.

Among the cases highlighted by the press is that of a 26-year-old Moroccan female footballer who drowned on the same day that, according to the newspaper, her visa to travel legally to Spain had been approved.

Her story captures one of the cruellest dimensions of the crisis.

Behind the statistics are personal choices, ambitions, frustrations and rumours that led some young people to risk their lives in a moment of desperation.

MMNEWS Analysis: defending Morocco through facts

Nearly two weeks after the crisis began, Morocco’s position appears more coherent than it did during the first hours.

The Kingdom restored tighter controls.

It cooperated in return operations.

It stated its readiness to work with Spain on the minors issue.

And it has begun prosecuting people suspected of facilitating irregular movements.

At the same time, no decisive public evidence has emerged showing that the Moroccan state issued instructions to organise the mass crossing.

That does not mean the questions should stop.

The public is entitled to know how such a large mobilisation formed so quickly, who issued the first calls and what weaknesses allowed so many people to converge on the border.

But defending the Kingdom’s interests does not mean denying legitimate questions.

It means distinguishing between a question and an accusation.

Between a hypothesis and evidence.

Between political controversy and established fact.

That is why Rabat’s strongest strategy is to continue documenting operations, publishing reliable data, identifying the networks under investigation and explaining the nature of its cooperation with Spain.

The clearer the facts become, the harder it will be to reduce a complex crisis to a single political narrative aimed at Morocco.

A crisis that also exposes Europe’s vulnerabilities

Ceuta has once again highlighted a basic geopolitical reality.

Europe can raise fences, multiply barriers and reinforce patrols.

But the stability of its southern border remains directly linked to cooperation with Morocco.

That does not mean the Kingdom should bear the burden alone.

Morocco deploys its forces, resources and security infrastructure, confronts smuggling networks and carries significant political and social costs while helping secure a space that does not concern Morocco alone.

It is therefore legitimate for Rabat to demand a more balanced partnership based on legal mobility, investment, training, development, judicial cooperation and a joint fight against criminal networks.

Morocco can be a central partner in European security. It should not become the permanent subcontractor of Europe’s borders.

The Ceuta crisis is no longer defined by the dramatic images of tens of thousands of people moving towards the border.

It has become quieter, but more complex.

It is present in centres housing minors.

In camps that still remain inside Ceuta.

In Moroccan courtrooms.

In WhatsApp groups circulating the date of August 15.

And in Spain’s political debate over responsibility.

The coming days will therefore be decisive.

If August 15 passes without a new major mobilisation, the crisis may finally enter a genuine resolution phase.

If online calls trigger another movement on the ground, Ceuta will once again demonstrate how, in the digital age, a border can be tested by a message before it is tested by a crowd.

Either way, one lesson remains clear:

Morocco must continue to act with firmness, transparency and responsibility—not only to protect its border, but also to remind its partners that stability in the western Mediterranean is built with the Kingdom, never without it.