Ceuta 2026: The border is calm, but the crisis enters a new phase.

In Ceuta, the images of crowds have disappeared, but the crisis is far from over.

The border is now broadly under control, and no new wave comparable to the end of July has been reported. Most of those who entered the enclave have returned to Morocco, although several thousand people are still believed to remain in Ceuta according to differing estimates.

In the streets, reception centres and peripheral areas, the nature of the emergency has changed. The question is no longer only how to prevent new crossings, but how to manage those who stayed behind.

At the heart of this new phase are unaccompanied minors.

More than 1,300 minors at the centre of the crisis

According to figures released by Spanish authorities, 1,342 minors have been registered in Ceuta.

Madrid wants to transfer some of them to other Spanish regions in order to ease pressure on the enclave, whose normal reception capacity has been overwhelmed.

But the plan is already creating significant political tension.

Several regional governments are challenging the redistribution mechanism and are calling for priority to be given to family reunification or, where legally possible, return to Morocco.

This is where Rabat’s position becomes particularly important.

The Kingdom has officially stated that it is ready to cooperate in the return of Moroccan minors, provided legal procedures and the best interests of the child are respected.

That clarifies one essential point:

Morocco is not opposing their return.

The main difficulties now lie largely within Spanish procedures, which require each case to be examined individually and do not allow collective returns without legal safeguards.

Madrid faces its own internal divisions

The Ceuta crisis is therefore increasingly becoming a domestic political crisis in Spain.

The central government is asking the regions to share responsibility for receiving minors.

Some autonomous communities are refusing.

Prosecutors are reminding regional authorities of their child-protection obligations.

And the opposition is accusing Pedro Sánchez of losing control of the border.

This shift is important.

At the beginning of the crisis, some Spanish political figures focused their criticism on Rabat.

One week later, the most visible problems now concern Spain’s own ability to organise reception, redistribution and possible legal returns.

For Morocco, the strongest position is to remain consistent: cooperate where it has clear responsibilities, while refusing to become the automatic target for Spain’s internal political and administrative failures.

How many people are still in Ceuta?

The exact number of people remaining in the enclave is still unclear.

Madrid previously estimated that around 2,000 people were still there after nearly 70,000 had returned.

Local officials in Ceuta, however, have offered much higher estimates, in some cases ranging from 3,000 to 6,000 people, or even more.

These discrepancies show how difficult it remains to establish a precise count.

Some migrants are staying in official facilities.

Others are living in makeshift camps or remain outside formal administrative systems.

Humanitarian organisations are therefore continuing to distribute food, clothing and assistance while the city gradually tries to return to normal.

The risk of a new digital mobilisation

The security file is not completely closed either.

New calls are circulating on WhatsApp, Facebook and other platforms around a possible collective crossing attempt on August 15.

At this stage, it is impossible to know whether those messages will lead to an actual mobilisation.

But their existence should be taken seriously.

The first wave showed that a digital rumour could move tens of thousands of people towards a border within a matter of hours.

It would therefore be a mistake to assume that the current calm is permanent.

For Moroccan authorities, the priority is now to identify the accounts behind these calls, combat disinformation and prevent new gatherings around Fnideq and Bab Sebta.

Morocco is a strategic partner, not Europe’s border guard

The crisis has also reinforced a strategic reality.

When Moroccan controls are operating at full capacity, pressure on Ceuta remains limited.

When that system comes under strain, even briefly, the consequences become immediately visible on the European side.

But this does not mean Morocco should carry responsibility for Europe’s southern border alone.

Quite the opposite.

The Kingdom already performs substantial work in coastal surveillance, combating criminal networks, preventing departures and maintaining security cooperation.

That contribution should be recognised within a balanced partnership.

Europe cannot treat Morocco as a simple service provider tasked with stopping would-be migrants from reaching its borders.

Cooperation must also include legal mobility pathways, investment, training, employment and development in the regions concerned.

The crisis is changing ground

The Ceuta file is now entering a new sequence.

The first phase was security-related.

The second has become humanitarian and political.

A third could become digital if the August 15 calls translate into real mobilisation.

For Rabat, the priorities are clear: maintain control, cooperate on the minors issue and document every action precisely.

This approach protects the Kingdom’s interests more effectively than exaggerated rhetoric.

The facts currently support Morocco’s position:

it helped restore calm;

it cooperated in returns;

it has agreed to work on the minors issue;

and no public evidence has established that it organised the initial wave.

Spain and Europe must now assume their share of responsibility.

Ceuta has regained calm.

But behind the barriers, the post-crisis phase remains unresolved.

Minors are waiting for decisions.

Thousands of people are still believed to remain in the enclave.

Madrid is facing its own internal divisions.

And new calls for crossings are already circulating online.

The next battle may therefore not take place only at the border.

It may also take place on smartphones, in Spanish courts and in negotiations between Rabat and its European partners.

One reality, however, is becoming increasingly clear:

The stability of this border depends on lasting cooperation with Morocco, but that cooperation can only work through mutual respect and a fair sharing of responsibilities.